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I. INTRODUCTION 
“To put the world in order, we must first put the nation in order; to 
put the nation in order, we must first put the family in order; to put the 
family in order, we must first cultivate our personal life.”1  
- Confucius 
 
While Confucius was decidedly not commenting on the law of 
intestacy and succession, his words help frame an age-old debate about 
who should inherit wealth and for what purpose.  A study of intestacy 
systems invariably exists at the intersection of the state, the family, and 
the individual.  Naturally, review of such systems helps lay bare a 
society’s values and ambitions. 
The law of succession often encompasses two interdependent, yet 
conflicting themes:  the support function and testamentary freedom.2  
Broadly speaking, civil law inheritance schemes like China have opted 
to emphasize support provisions to ensure the welfare of their collective 
community.3  These provisions are meant to function on two fronts:  to 
help support a surviving dependent at the decedent’s death and to help 
encourage support of the decedent during life.4 
Conversely, common law jurisdictions like the United States stress 
testamentary freedom—the idea that each individual has the right to 
dispose of her property how she sees fit, at death.5  American courts will 
enforce the presumed intent of the individual testator, even if at odds 
with society’s notion of justice or commonsense.6  Like support, 
testamentary freedom also functions on two fronts.  On one hand, rigid 
judicial interpretation of laws may prevent the passing of property to a 
deserving loved-one; on the other, too much judicial discretion may lead 
to the intestate hijacking of a decedent’s wealth.7 
The battle lines are drawn on each side of the Pacific: collective 
socialism versus capitalistic individualism.  But that would be an over-
simplification of the debate.  In fact, both systems, despite their vast 
differences, share the common goal of providing support for their 
 
 1. KATHLEEN TRACY, THE LIFE AND TIMES OF CONFUCIUS 4 (Mitchell Lane 
Publishers, Inc. 2005).  Confucius was a philosopher, politician, and legalist of the Ming 
dynasty in China.  He championed filial loyalty as an ideal and functional basis for society. 
Id. 
 2. See infra Sections III.A, III.D. 
 3. See infra Section III.D. 
 4. See infra Section III.D. 
 5. See infra Section III.A. 
 6. See infra Section III.A. 
 7. See infra Section III.A. 
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respective populations while ensuring testamentary freedom.8  Indeed, 
instead of battle lines, the relationship may be more accurately described 
as yin and yang. Or yin and yank, to borrow from the title of this Note.  
Ultimately, this debate is not about picking sides but about picking 
reforms.  We can have our cake and eat it too. 
This Note supports the contention that the United States can and 
should adopt more support-based measures without sacrificing 
testamentary freedom.  Part II provides a brief background of Western 
intestacy law,9 while Part III  analyzes in-depth the divide between 
American and Chinese intestacy law.10  Specifically, Part III examines 
the inherent status-based biases of the American system and the 
shortfalls of presumed majoritarian intent, ultimately leading to a 
discussion of unworthy heirs.11  Then, it explores the complexities of 
China’s behavior-based system, analyzing both forced heirship 
provisions and family maintenance schemes.12  Finally, Part III reviews 
case law, first in China and then in the U.S.13  Part IV of this Note 
presents the issues facing American law today, including the lack of 
support, under-inclusive statutory language, perverse incentives for 
unworthy heirs and lack of judicial discretion.14  Lastly, Part V concludes 
that the benefits of the American system are outweighed by its human 
costs.15  I propose tipping the scale in favor of merit and need-based 
inheritance in the United States. 
II. BACKGROUND 
The law of succession dates back millennia.16  To avoid violent 
conflict for property after death, ancient laws of distribution were 
developed over time.17  As far back as Roman law, we see evidence of 
property schemes to ensure proper distribution of a decedent’s estate, 
whereby succession might extend as far as the sixth collateral line.18 
 
 8. See infra Section III.D. 
 9. See infra Section II. 
 10. See infra Section III. 
 11. See infra Sections III.A, III.B, III.C. 
 12. See infra Sections III.D. 
 13. See infra Sections III.E, III.F, III.G, III.H, III.I. 
 14. See infra Section IV. 
 15. See infra Section V. 
 16. 2 William Blackstone, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 11-12. 
 17. Id. at 4.  Blackstone notes that the “good order of the world [would be] continually 
broken and disturbed, while a variety of persons were striving who should get the first 
occupation of the same thing.” Id. 
 18. David V. DeRosa, Intestate Succession and the Laughing Heir: Who Do We Want to 
Get the Last Laugh?, 12 QUINNIPIAC PROB. L.J. 153, 155 (1997). 
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In the medieval Dark Ages of Europe, the practice of 
primogeniture19 took hold, thereby imposing a far stricter system on the 
passing of property.  Whereas the Romans made no distinction of age or 
gender, medieval titleholders passed their property to first sons, at the 
exclusion of all younger siblings.20  By limiting the pool of potential 
heirs, primogeniture led to the conception of escheat.  In the event the 
property could not pass to a viable heir, the title would revert to the 
feudal lord.21  The rationale for escheat is simple and enduring.  Where 
there is no heir, the state shall take possession of property to ensure 
peace, order, and efficiency.22  While primogeniture has dissipated into 
the annals of history, the English common law has retained the rule of 
escheat.23 
III. TESTAMENTARY FREEDOM OR SUPPORT? 
A. American Inheritance Model 
Western countries have long promoted freedom of testation.24  The 
notion that it is an individual’s birthright to determine the distribution of 
her property after death has drawn scholars since the passage of the 
Statute of Wills in sixteenth century England.25  Natural rights 
proponents maintain that the creation of wealth entitles a person to freely 
distribute that property, while Bentham Utilitarians point to the 
incentives to create and save furnished by such a scheme.26 
Although testamentary freedom remains a fundamental tenant of 
American law and society, such a right has never been found in the 
federal Constitution.27  Thus, the job of regulating inheritance has fallen 
to the states, which have a “broad authority to adjust the rules governing 
the descent and devise of property.”28  Despite this mandate, state 
 
 19. Primogeniture, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 20. DeRosa, supra note 18, at 155-56. 
 21. Escheat, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 22. 2 WILLIAMS BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *10-11.  Blackstone describes the 
state’s interest:  “In case he neglects to dispose of it, or is not permitted to make any disposition 
at all, the municipal law of the country then steps in, and declares who shall be the successor, 
representative, or heir of the deceased; that is, who alone shall have the right to enter upon 
this vacant possession, in order to avoid the confusion which it’s becoming again common 
would occasion.” Id. 
 23. E.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-105 (2010). 
 24. Seymour Moskowitz, Adult Children and Indigent Parents:  Intergenerational 
Responsibilities in International Perspective, 86 MARQ. L. REV. 401, 449 (2002). 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. See Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 717 (1987) (finding that restrictions on inheritance 
did not implicate the Just Compensation Clause). 
 28. Id. 
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legislatures have been reluctant to restrict testamentary freedom, 
preferring instead to pass rigid laws promoting a “dead hand” rule.29  
Accordingly, distribution of any particular estate has been subject to 
inflexible rules of inheritance, which value family status over any 
objective assessment on merit or need of a beneficiary.30 
The rationale behind this rigid approach is one of predictability.31  
By sticking fast to ironclad rules of succession, the mathematics of estate 
planning should theoretically be consistent over time, avoiding 
protracted litigation, unsettled law, and emotional hardship for surviving 
claimants.32  Moreover, the intestacy regime is supported by presumed 
majoritarian intent.33  Essentially, the question being answered is, 
“[h]ow would most people like their estate distributed in default, in the 
unfortunate event of their death?”34  Overwhelmingly, lawmakers in the 
United States believe that most individuals would want their property to 
pass to their surviving spouse, their issue, and finally their collateral, in 
that order.35 If no viable heir can be determined, the property passes to 
the state, escheat representing the ultimate default.36 
But, is this truly the presumed American intent?  A system 
eschewing the traditional, fixed-rule model may narrow the gap between 
presumed intent and actual intent by considering such things as past 
relationships and financial need, but at what cost to efficiency?  
Testamentary intent is a double-edged sword and ultimately, it is 
fundamentally restricted by the tyranny of majoritarian thinking. 
B. The Family Paradigm 
Some scholars have been quick to point out the inherent biases of 
the American system.  Professor Lawrence Friedman observed that 
succession laws function as a “genetic code of society.”37  Such laws 
may seek to maintain the status quo by ensuring that each generation 
replicates its predecessor.38  Thus, the principle function of United States 
intestacy law is to “maintain and perpetuate the social unit that 
 
 29. Moskowitz, supra note 24, at 449. 
 30. Id at 450.  Generally, inheritance is restricted to the decedent’s closest relatives by 
blood or marriage. 
 31. Thomas E. Simmons, A Chinese Inheritance, 30 QUINNIPIAC PROB. L.J., 124, 128 
(2017). 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, THE LAW OF SUCCESSION IN SOCIAL PERSPECTIVE, in 
DEATH, TAXES AND FAMILY PROPERTY 9, 14 (Edward C. Halbach Jr. ed. 1977). 
 38. Id. 
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Americans have traditionally deemed essential for a stable and 
productive society—the nuclear family unit.”39  This inert focus on the 
immediate family may represent a failure of American lawmakers to 
adapt to the changing lifestyles of an increasingly diverse society.  More 
than anything, the Family Paradigm40 may be failing Americans in a vital 
function of intestacy: support. 
Over the past thirty years, American legislators have proffered a 
vision of a public welfare system less reliant on the government and 
more reliant on private actors, specifically the family unit, as a 
mechanism for the support of dependents.41  In theory, American 
inheritance law performs this crucial welfare function by encouraging 
those with wealth to provide for their survivors.42  In practice, however, 
the rigid Family Paradigm may have caused more harm to dependents 
than advantage, such that “when support conflicts with family 
preservation, support yields.”43 
American law restricts succession to “the natural object of the 
decedent’s bounty.”44  Such a maxim necessarily limits inheritance to 
filial sanguinity at the expense of any merit or support-based 
considerations.  Thus, a decedent’s closest relatives automatically 
inherit, irrespective of their need or past relationship with the decedent.45  
Generally, this remains the case even if the heir abandoned or physically 
abused the decedent.46  If no “close” family members exist, the law 
typically ignores extended family members, caregivers, long-term 
dependents and friends to confer a windfall on distant relatives.47  Such 
heirs may have never met the decedent, and yet they are “laughing” all 
the way to the bank instead of the non-relative suffering a sense of loss 
and who may have supported the decedent for years.48  Although the 
Uniform Probate Code (UPC) has sought to limit the issue of “laughing 
 
 39. Frances H. Foster, The Family Paradigm of Inheritance Law, 80 N.C. L. REV. 199, 
204 (2001). 
 40. Id. Frances Foster asserts that the law of intestacy in the United States is primarily 
concerned with the preservation and perpetuation of the traditional American family unit at 
the expense of support-based functions and refers to this systemic injustice as the Family 
Paradigm. Id. 
 41. See Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. 
L. No. 104–193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996). 
 42. Foster, supra note 39, at 205. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. at 207. 
 45. Id. at 205. 
 46. Id. at 207. 
 47. Id. at 206-07. 
 48. DeRosa, supra note 18, at 158. 
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heirs” by restricting inheritance to the second collateral line,49 some 
jurisdictions remain steadfast to the common law.50  The fact that 
“laughing heirs” somehow satisfy the “natural object of the decedent’s 
bounty” standard, while stepchildren or committed partners do not, is 
proof enough that the Family Paradigm needs rethinking.51  Nor is the 
bias confined to intestacy. 
Indeed, donative freedom can be illusory even when opting out of 
the default majoritarian intestacy scheme.52  This issue is especially 
pronounced when the testator tries to leave property to those outside the 
immediate family through wills or will substitutes.53  In theory, the 
guiding practice is testamentary intent, but in practice such intent 
quickly yields to the pressures of the Paradigm.  The below examples 
illustrate this point. 
1. Wrinkles in the Family Paradigm 
a. Capacity 
Courts often massage mental capacity doctrines such as “insane 
delusion” and “undue influence” to reach results consistent with 
society’s notion of the proper, traditional family.54  For example, one of 
the prongs of mental capacity is that the testator knows the persons that 
are the “natural object[s] of his or her bounty.”55  Thus, if the will omits 
or even misnames “natural objects”—essentially family members—it is 
likely to be denied probate on mental capacity grounds.56   
Furthermore, the support function is in fact chilled by such 
practices.  Proof of long-term support and care of the decedent suggests 
that a “confidential relationship” exists between the decedent and her 
 
 49. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-103 (2010).  Under UPC 2-103(a)(4), the most remote 
heirs to the estate would be descendants of the decedent’s grandparents, including 
grandparents, aunts, uncles, and first cousins.  No other remote heirs have claim to the estate, 
or standing to challenge a will. Id. 
 50. DeRosa, supra note 18, at 164. 
 51. See DeRosa, supra note 18; Foster, supra note 39, at 210. 
 52. E. Gary Spitko, Gone But Not Conforming:  Protecting the Abhorrent Testator from 
Majoritarian Cultural Norms Through Minority-Culture Arbitration, 49 CASE W. RES. L. 
REV. 275, 276 (1999). 
 53. Id.  Spitko explains that this bias “imperils any estate plan that disfavors the testator’s 
legal spouse or close blood relations in favor of non-family beneficiaries.” Id. 
 54. Foster, supra note 39, at 210; Spitko, supra note 52, at 283 (positing that such 
doctrines are “sufficiently nebulous that they enable the fact-finder to rewrite the testator’s 
estate plan in accordance with societal norms”). 
 55. Pamela Champine, Expertise and Instinct in the Assessment of Testamentary 
Capacity, 51 VILL. L. REV. 25, 31 (2006). 
 56. Powell v. Conner, Case No. CA85-04-020, 1986 Ohio App. LEXIS 5241 (Jan. 13, 
1986). 
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caregiver.57  Evidence of a “confidential relationship” can lead to a 
presumption against the bequest, forcing the claimant to bear the burden 
of proving that the relationship was not exploitative of the indisposed 
testator.58 
b. Anti-Lapse Statutes 
Common law lapse rules only further the biases of the system.59  In 
the widespread situation whereby a decedent fails to update her will and 
consequently makes a bequest to an heir who predeceases her, that 
bequest will fail rather than passing to the heirs of the predeceased 
(unless explicitly stipulated in the will).60  Such a result, in most cases, 
is wholly inconsistent with the presumed intent of the testator.61  While 
most jurisdictions have adopted anti-lapse provisions, consistent with 
the amended UPC, the exception only serves to reinforce the Family 
Paradigm.62  Anti-lapse laws substitute another taker for the 
predeceased, in effect saving the will, but only in cases where the 
predeceased was a blood relative, survived and represented by issue.63  
Once again, non-relatives and caretakers are out of luck. 
c. Judicial Interpretation and Omitted Heirs 
Moreover, despite the common refrain that courts want to avoid 
intestacy at all costs, judges usually employ rules of strict compliance to 
invalidate ambiguous or incomplete wills.64  If a decedent fails to update 
a will after a marriage, divorce or the birth of a child, courts presume 
oversight and instead opt to funnel the bequest through the intestacy 
scheme.65  Omitted spouse statutes reward post-will spouses with an 
intestacy share while pretermitted heir statutes reward post-will issue.66  
Even upon divorce, the law presumes severed ties and nullifies the will 
through revocation based on the idea that a divorced spouse is no longer 
a “natural object of the decedent’s bounty.”67 
 
 57. Foster, supra note 39, at 212. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. at 213. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Foster, supra note 39, at 213-14. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. at 212-13. 
 65. Id. at 214. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Peevy v. Mutual Servs. Cas. Ins. Co., 346 N.W.2d 120, 123 (1984) (where an ex-
wife lost entitlement to support because of a determination that most ex-wives would not be 
a “natural object of decedent’s bounty”); the Uniform Probate Code also revokes “any 
disposition or appointment created by law or in a governing instrument to a relative of the 
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Generally, as evidenced by the above examples, American courts 
provide little latitude in determining what is “natural” when it comes to 
probating wills.  As a result, “the sacred canon of will construction, the 
‘presumption against intestacy,’ is effectively nullified by the ‘equally 
potent’ presumption that an intestate heir can be disinherited only by 
plain words.”68 
d. “Natural” Relationships 
A necessary implication of the American inheritance system is that 
some human relationships are not on equal footing with others—that 
only some associations matter.69  By promulgating the traditional 
American family, the system “declares ‘unnatural’ the very relationships 
that many people, but most frequently ethnic and cultural minorities 
often experience as ‘natural’—caring relationships with extended family 
members, nonmarital partners, close friends and nonrelated 
caregivers.”70  Extended care systems have long been a cultural norm for 
numerous minority communities within the United States.71  By choice 
or necessity, many children are now raised by extended family members 
or other non-legal caregivers.72  Such relationships are not recognized 
under American intestacy law, which effectively subordinates ethnic 
differences and promotes the traditional American family, at the expense 
of care and support.73 
While the Paradigm seeks to promote support within the immediate 
family through a presumed majoritarian intent, a considerable portion of 
the population is excluded from the pool of potential heirs.  Such a result 
is difficult to reconcile from both a moral and economic standpoint.  
Instead of incentivizing good behavior, the Family Paradigm sanctions 
inheritance by “unworthy heirs.”74 
 
divorced individual’s former spouse.” UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-804(b)(1)(A) (amended 
2010). 
 68. Foster, supra note 39, at 213. 
 69. Elvia R. Arriola, Law and the Family of Choice and Need, 35 U. LOUISVILLE J. FAM. 
L. 691, 694 (arguing that the non-traditional family is no different from the traditional family 
and questioning why some non-traditional relationships, based on sexual status or human 
rights status are not considered “natural” or legal). 
 70. Foster, supra note 39, at 245. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. at 246. 
 73. Id. 
 74. See Moskowitz, supra note 24, at 401 (relating “the bitterness of abandonment” 
experienced by indigent parents at the whims of adult children). 
7_BROWN FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/6/2019  5:19 PM 
248 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol:59 
C. Unworthy Heirs 
Like the meek, the undeserving often inherit the earth, at least in 
the United States.75  There is only one widespread exception to 
inheritance by “unworthy heirs:” the Slayer Rule.76  Under Slayer 
Statutes, if an heir kills the decedent, the heir’s status as taker is 
extinguished.77  The Uniform Probate Code formulates the Slayer Rule 
as follows: 
An individual who feloniously and intentionally kills the decedent 
forfeits all benefits under this [article] with respect to the decedent’s 
estate, including an intestate share, an elective share, an omitted 
spouse’s or child’s share, a homestead allowance, exempt property, 
and a family allowance.  If the decedent died intestate, the decedent’s 
intestate estate passes as if the killer disclaimed his [or her] intestate 
share.78 
The forfeiture of inheritance under the Slayer Rule may, at first 
glance, come across as punishment for the killer’s wrongful conduct.  
This was the case at common law, where judges applied the underlying 
notion that wrongdoers should not be allowed to profit from their 
wrongdoing.79  However, modern scholars largely recognize that Slayer 
Statutes are “designed to preserve the integrity of [the] property-transfer 
system by preventing a person from altering, by means of a wrongful 
slaying, the course of property succession as intended by the source of 
the property.”80  Thus, the Slayer exception does not exist for punitive 
purposes in discouraging “unworthy heirs,” but merely serves to effect 
the decedent’s presumed intent. 
As it exists, the Slayer exception is very narrow, only covering 
intentional killings.81  Indeed, the heir who abandoned, ridiculed, libeled, 
abused, or even tortured the decedent could still inherit, so long as the 
heir was not a direct cause of the decedent’s death.82 Accordingly, many 
reformers recommend expanding the unworthy heir doctrine to penalize 
 
 75. Matthew 5:5 (King James).  “Blessed are the meek:  for they shall inherit the earth.” 
Id. 
 76. Simmons, supra note 31, at 129. 
 77. Id. 
 78. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-803(b) (2010). 
 79. Richard Lewis Brown, Undeserving Heirs?—The Case of the “Terminated” Parent, 
40 U. RICH. L. REV. 547, 558 (2006).  The Slayer Rule first appeared as the application of the 
equitable maxim nullus commodum capere potest de injuria sua propria (“no one shall take 
advantage of his own wrong”). Id. 
 80. Id. at 559. 
 81. Simmons, supra note 31, at 129. 
 82. Id. 
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not only “slayers,” but also heirs that inadequately supported the 
decedent.83 
The human costs of this strict, status-based scheme are readily 
apparent.  A system that prizes blood above need, affection, or conduct 
may intrinsically result in injustice.84  Unworthy heirs can, and do, 
inherit.85  Such a paradigm allows a son to inherit from a father he has 
ignored for thirty years; it allows a daughter to inherit from a mother 
who she has refused to provide care for in her parent’s struggle with a 
terminal illness; it paints sympathetic and supportive neighbors as 
swindlers and exploitation artists.86  Assuredly, a father could even 
inherit insurance payouts or wrongful death claims from a deceased 
daughter he sexually abused.87  Surely, society can do better than 
allowing wrongdoers to inherit from their victims.  Is expanding the 
“unworthy heirs” doctrine enough to deter misconduct and encourage 
support?  Or must we overhaul the entire Family Paradigm? 
Some reformers advocate the “behavior-based model of 
succession,” in which courts are permitted to deviate from strict status-
based definitions in cases of good and bad behavior.88  Contingent on 
conduct, a judge has the power to deny inheritance rights to even the 
closest relative.89  For those reformers, China represents a more ideal 
model of intestacy, where support functions and conduct are linked with 
inheritance. 
D. China’s Behavior-Based Model 
China’s legal history dates back thousands of years to a time when 
the country was ruled by “ethics based law that blended dynastic codes 
with Confucian principles.”90  Confucian law developed around two 
principles:  belief in the nobleman (jūn zï) and the formation of a well-
ordered society.91  Traditionally, the term “jūn zï” referred to men of 
noble birth.92  Confucius, however, reformulated the notion of a 
nobleman, asserting that such nobility was achieved through merit, not 
 
 83. Foster, supra note 39, at 230, 234. 
 84. See Foster, supra note 39. 
 85. Id. at 240. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Paula Monopoli, “Deadbeat Dads”:  Should Support and Inheritance Be Linked?, 
49 U. MIAMI L. REV. 257, 260 (1994); Foster, supra note 39, at 240. 
 88. See id. 
 89. Foster, supra note 39, at 230-31. 
 90. Simmons, supra note 31, at 124. 
 91. Aris Teon, Law in Imperial China—Confucianism and Legalism, GREATER CHINA 
J. (May 7, 2016), https://china-journal.org/2016/05/07/law-in-imperial-china-confucianism-
legalism/. 
 92. Id. 
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birth.93  A nobleman exhibits humanity, virtue, and righteousness.94  
Perhaps most importantly, in order to establish a “well-ordered society,” 
a nobleman must practice filial piety.95  Indeed, most of Confucian law 
was not codified but was instead ritualistic, practiced ideally through the 
five human relationships of father-son, husband-wife, sibling-sibling, 
friend-friend, and ultimately, ruler-subject.96  Without codified laws, a 
ruler led his people with virtue, creating a sense of shame to prevent 
unwanted conduct.97 
The contemporary laws of inheritance, in contrast, are quite fresh.  
Roy Girasa provides a brief history: 
From 1949 to 1957, after abolishing all laws enacted by the 
[nationalist] government, a few laws were passed dealing with law 
reform, marriage and trade unions.  Judges had to decide cases in 
accordance with governmental policy . . . Anarchy reigned during 
the Cultural Revolution in the late 1960s and early 1970s.  The death 
of Mao in 1976 led to significant reforms . . . Legislation was drafted 
and enacted that lent some credibility to the rule of law within 
China.98 
China opened to the world in 1979,99 followed by the adoption of a 
new constitution in 1982100 and the contemporary Law of Succession in 
1985.101  China’s engagement with the world has led to substantial 
changes to and experimentation with the law of succession within the 
country.102  Despite the passage of time, however, it remains evident that 
China’s Confucian past shapes its present, as the government looks to 
establish a “well-ordered society” through intestacy.103 
Over the past thirty years, both China and the United States. have 
engaged in striking overhauls of their welfare and support networks.104  
Surprisingly, in its drive to modernize, China seems to share a common 
 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
 97. TUNG-TSU CHU, LAW AND SOCIETY IN TRADITIONAL CHINA 280 (1965). 
 98. Roy J. Girasa, Legal Aspects of Doing Business in China, 20 WESTCHESTER B.J. 305, 
305 (1993). 
 99. Simmons, supra note 31, at 125. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. See id. 
 103. See Frances H. Foster, Linking Support and Inheritance: A New Model From China, 
1999 WIS. L. REV. 1199, 1202 (1999) [hereinafter Linking Support and Inheritance]. 
 104. Id.; see also Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 
1996, Pub. L. No. 104–193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996) (containing extensive enforcement 
measures of child support obligations and referencing the responsibility of the able-bodied to 
work and the prudence of the poor to not give birth to children they cannot support). 
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goal with its capitalist rival across the Pacific Ocean in pushing for 
reform.105  Both countries are theoretically attempting to shift the burden 
of welfare from government to the private sector, specifically targeting 
the family as a mechanism for support of dependents.106  Essentially, 
China and the United States alike seek to promote individual 
responsibility and dispel any notion of a legal right to cradle-to-grave 
public welfare.107  The means taken to achieve this goal, however, 
diverge starkly.108  In its reform effort, China has turned to the tool of 
succession law to activate private support of dependents by linking 
inheritance with merit.109 
In contrast to American succession law, China recognizes 
“dependence as the gravamen of inheritance,” where the passing of 
property operates through need rather than entitlement.110  If an 
individual dies intestate, courts (representing the decedent) have 
considerable discretion in allocating property according to her actual 
intent, not some imagined majoritarian fiction.111  Whereas an American 
testator can “pauperize” his dependents, a Chinese court will invalidate 
such disinheritance, utilizing its substantial powers in equity.112   
Nonetheless, a testator in China is afforded considerable latitude in 
distributing her estate testate.113  The “behavior-based model” explicitly 
extends support to any dependent outside the decedent’s immediate 
family.114  So, while an empowered court in equity may serve to limit 
testamentary freedom, the non-relative provisions under Chinese statute 
compensate the testator, ultimately ensuring a closer approximation of 
her actual intent.  Thus, China’s scheme is one of flexibility, where 
successions of estates are tailored according to merit and need.115  This 
is accomplished in two ways:  forced heirship provisions and family 
maintenance schemes.116 
 
 105. Linking Support and Inheritance, supra note 103, at 1201. 
 106. Id. at 1200. 
 107. Id.   
 108. Id. at 1202. 
 109. Id. at 1203.   
 110. Id. at 1217.   
 111. Simmons, supra note 31, at 126. 
 112. Linking Support and Inheritance, supra note 103, at 1217-21 (citing Herbert D. 
Laube, The Right of a Testator to Pauperize His Helpless Dependents, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 559 
(1928)). 
 113. See Linking Support and Inheritance, supra note 103, at 1217.   
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. at 1210. 
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1. Forced Heirship Provisions 
Forced heirship provisions set aside fixed portions of the decedent’s 
estate for qualifying relationships, usually children.117  Shares are 
awarded exclusively on the basis of familial status.118  While automatic 
shares by definition cannot take into account need or merit, such a 
scheme prevents against unjust disinheritance, protecting a vital family 
support function at the expense of testamentary freedom.  Proponents 
view forced heirship as a fix for the disintegrating family in that it binds 
inheritance and family support mechanisms.119  Critics view its “fickle 
fractions” as arbitrary and too rigid to achieve its support objectives.120 
Forced heirship models are common to civil law countries.121  One 
American commentator notes, “most of the civilized countries in the 
world provide direct protection from disinheritance to children of a 
testator.”122  The United States, then, does not qualify as a “civilized 
country,” as forced heirship provisions have been rejected in forty-nine 
of fifty states.123  In contrast, China has followed the lead of civil law 
countries by enacting a mandatory share.124 
Article 19 of the People’s Republic of China (P.R.C.) Inheritance 
Law provides what is referred to as a “necessary portion” to heirs of an 
estate, as long as they are “unable to work” and “have no source of 
income.” (emphasis added).125  According to the guidelines of the 
Supreme People’s Court, Article 19 has three basic characteristics.126  
First, any heir entitled to inherit under intestacy can qualify, so long as 
they are unable to work and have no source of income.127  As such, all 
 
 117. Id. 
 118. Linking Support and Inheritance, supra note 103, at 1211. 
 119. Id. at 1212.   
 120. Id. at 1213. 
 121. Ralph C. Brashier, Disinheritance and the Modern Family, 45 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 
83, 117 (1994).   
 122. Id.  Just a few of the numerous countries around the world to protect children from 
complete disinheritance include Argentina, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, France, Germany, 
Japan, Sweden, and Switzerland. Id. at 117 n.111. 
 123. Louisiana, a product of the Napoleonic Codes, is the only civil law jurisdiction in the 
nation.  The mandatory nature of the share was significantly decreased in the late 1980s, and 
now only provides for children under the age of twenty-four.  Each child under the age of 
twenty-four receives a twenty-five percent mandatory share of the estate.  Michael W. 
Gilligan, ‘Forced Heirship’ in the United States of America, with Particular Reference to New 
York State, 22 TRUST & TRUSTEES, https://www.phillipsnizer.com/pdf/Article-
Trusts_Trustees%20-%20Forced%20heirship%20in%20the%20United%20States%20-
%20Galligan%20(2016).pdf. 
 124. Ya-Hui Hsu, Should China Adopt Taiwan’s Mandatory Share Doctrine?, 29 PENN 
ST. INT’L L. REV. 289, 291 (2010). 
 125. Id. at 291-92. 
 126. Id. at 295. 
 127. Id. 
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intestate heirs are covered, not merely the decedent’s children and 
issue.128  Article 19 also encompasses spouses, grandparents, siblings, 
needy parents, step relatives, and widowed sons and daughters-in-law.129   
Second, if a potential heir qualifies, such that she is unable to work 
and without income, there are two prescribed remedies:130  (i) if the estate 
is so small that it cannot be split up, the qualifying heir is given the 
entirety of the estate and the testator’s contrary bequest is void;131 or  (ii) 
if the estate is large enough to split up, a qualifying heir under Article 19 
must receive his mandatory share first before the testator’s bequest to 
other legatees is given effect.132   
Finally, the court makes Article 19 determinations at the time the 
will becomes effective, not its date of execution.133  In order to qualify 
as unable to work and without income, thereby receiving a “necessary 
portion,” a potential heir must maintain these conditions through the 
death of the testator.134  Likewise, if an heir does not qualify for a share 
at the time of execution of the will or will substitute, she may still be 
able to meet the requirements upon the testator’s death.135 
Accordingly, China’s forced heirship provision, Article 19, 
explicitly replaces status with need as the ultimate determination in any 
succession of property.136  Such a scheme allows for the support of the 
indigent-dependent and generally prohibits unjust disinheritances.  
Additionally, as most potential heirs are either able to work or have an 
income, Article 19 is muted in its impact on testamentary freedom.137   
2. Family Maintenance Schemes 
Perhaps the most startling thing about Chinese inheritance law is its 
willingness to invoke judicial review of an intestate heir’s conduct in 
distributing an estate.138  The family maintenance model allows judges, 
on a case-by-case basis, to assess the relative merits of a decedent’s 
testamentary bequest and the challenges to that disposition brought by 
survivors.139  Take note:  the scheme does not apply automatically but 
 
 128. Linking Support and Inheritance, supra note 103, at 1222. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Hsu, supra note 124, at 295. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. at 295-96. 
 133. Id. at 296. 
 134. Id. at 297. 
 135. Hsu, supra note 124, at 297. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Simmons, supra note 31, at 125-26. 
 139. Linking Support and Inheritance, supra note 103, at 1214. 
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rather is only deployed to provide remedies for “qualifying, aggrieved 
claimants.”140 
This sort of judicial discretion has generated impassioned debate 
among American intestacy scholars.141  Proponents find a strong moral 
appeal in embedding a legal principle that “familial responsibility does 
not terminate at death.”142  They also cite the privatization of social 
welfare as a substantial benefit.143  Critics contend that the family 
maintenance model introduces unnecessary complexity and 
inconsistency into the probate system, thereby promoting litigation, 
increasing costs and depleting estates.144  Crucially, detractors claim that 
making powerful rules of equity available to judges is incompatible with 
American notions of testamentary freedom.145 
As referenced above,146 Article 19 of the P.R.C. Inheritance Law 
provides qualifying heirs with a “necessary portion” of the estate, but 
neither the Chinese legislature nor the judiciary has defined the term.147  
Rather, the term has taken shape through past decisions.148  Courts have 
determined a “necessary portion” to mean “the amount needed to meet a 
qualified heir’s ‘fundamental needs.’ ” 149 While this logically should be 
interpreted as reasonable living expense, courts instead look to the size 
of the estate and the qualified heir’s subjective standard of living to 
determine a distribution.150 
Only increasing the discretionary capabilities of Chinese courts is 
Article 14 of the P.R.C. Inheritance Law, which extends Article 19 relief 
to all of the decedent’s dependents, irrespective of family status.151  In 
addition to Article 19’s dual standard of inability to work with no 
income, Article 14 imposes an additional burden on the potential heir:  it 
requires that claimants must have “relied on the decedent’s support.”152  
 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. at 1213. 
 142. Id. at 1214. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Linking Support and Inheritance, supra note 103, at 1215. 
 145. Id.   
 146. See supra Section III.D.1. 
 147. Hsu, supra note 124, at 296.   
 148. Id.   
 149. Id.   
 150. Id.   
 151. Linking Support and Inheritance, supra note 103, at 1226-27.  Foster asserts, “[t]o 
protect more distant family and nonrelated dependents from disinheritance, China 
supplements its forced share scheme with a second, equitable redistribution technique.”  Id. 
at 1227; Law of Succession of the People’s Republic of China, 1 October 1985, Article 14 
[hereinafter P.R.C. Succession Law]. 
 152. Linking Support and Inheritance, supra note 103, at 1227; P.R.C. Succession Law 
Art. 14.   
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Unlike Article 19, Article 14 does not represent a mandatory share but 
merely provides a path for aggrieved dependents to claim an 
“appropriate” share.153   
Once again, the term “appropriate” has necessarily been formulated 
by courts on a case-by-case basis, at the behest of the highest court in the 
land, the Supreme People’s Court.154  Judges have read Article 14’s 
provisions expansively, qualifying not only siblings and distant relatives 
but also friends, neighbors and colleagues.155  Essentially, courts are 
invited to adjust award valves depending on whether an individual 
supported the decedent (merit) or relied on the decedent for support 
(need).156 
Accordingly, the Chinese family maintenance model recognizes 
both support situations and provides awards for the truly deserving or 
the truly needy through heightened judicial discretion.  This ability of 
the court to “place its finger on the scale of intestacy” and consider 
“support provided to or received by the decedent,”157 coupled with 
Article 19’s forced share provisions, constitutes a powerful model, 
whereby China can protect all of a decedent’s dependents, irrespective 
of family status.158  The following cases serve to reinforce the support 
benefits of such a system, thereby highlighting deficiencies in the 
American scheme. 
E. Estate of Zhang 
Zhang, the decedent, left no statutory heirs, and thus his estate was 
in danger of escheat.159  He had previously been married to Ms. Xu, 
however, the union only lasted ten years. The marriage produced no 
children but while this was Zhang’s first marriage, it was not Xu’s, who 
had mothered a son in her previous marriage, Hua Xu.  Under Article 10 
of the P.R.C. Inheritance Law, stepparents, stepchildren, and step-
siblings are elevated to first-order heirs so long as they had a “support 
relationship” with the decedent.160  Here, the court reasoned that Hua Xu 
did not qualify as an automatic intestate heir since his status was 
 
 153. Linking Support and Inheritance, supra note 103, at 1228; P.R.C. Succession Law 
Art. 14.   
 154. Linking Support and Inheritance, supra note 103, at 1229.  In a broad ruling, the 
Court found that an Article 14 claimant “can receive more or less than an intestate share when 
the estate is distributed, depending on the specific circumstances.” Id. 
 155. Id. at 1228. 
 156. Simmons, supra note 31, at 140. 
 157. Id. at 126. 
 158. Linking Support and Inheritance, supra note 103, at 1222. 
 159. Simmons, supra note 31, at 141-42; Case No. 02053 (Beijing First Intermediate 
People’s Court, Apr. 20, 2015). 
 160. P.R.C. Succession Law Art. 10. 
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terminated upon the divorce of his mother and the decedent.161  
Therefore, his claim of succession rights was entirely contingent on 
whether a support relationship existed between him and Zhang, his ex-
stepfather. 
Hua Xu was twenty-six years old when his mother married Zhang, 
yet he continued to live under their roof.  Following the couple’s divorce, 
the claimant remained closely associated with the decedent, visiting him 
and providing emotional support until his death.  When Zhang died, it 
was Hua Xu who settled his accounts and made funeral arrangements.  
Since Hua Xu had lost his heirship status under Article 19, the Beijing 
First Intermediate People’s Court was compelled to exploit the elasticity 
of Article 14, ultimately finding that the claimant deserved an 
“appropriate” share.162 
The facts of this case exist in somewhat of a vacuum, considering 
that the estate was destined to escheat.163  Rarely are circumstances so 
straightforward in Chinese intestacy.  Still, Zhang serves to highlight the 
discretion of the P.R.C. Inheritance Law regime. Essentially, there exist 
two nets of equity that courts can deploy to catch needy dependents that 
fall through the cracks.  Having made the determination that Zhang’s 
divorce terminated Hua Xu’s  Article 19 rights as a stepchild heir, the 
court moved on to Article 14, finding that the claimant was “unable to 
work,” “without income,” and “dependent on the decedent’s support.”164  
While it is not quite clear what compelled the court to find an inability 
to work on the part of the claimant, it is likely they applied their equitable 
discretion to ensure that the estate would not pass escheat.165  The court’s 
final calculation of an “appropriate share” resulted in the passage of the 
entire estate to Hua Xu.  In American courts, such an allocation for an 
ex-stepson is unheard of.166  Indeed, an ex-stepson claimant would not 
even have standing to challenge the succession.167 
 
 161. The question of whether divorce or death terminates the status of stepchildren has 
led to inconsistent results in the Chinese system. Case No. 00590 (Second Mid. People’s Ct., 
Beijing, Feb. 11, 2015) (China) (where the judge found the stepchild status of the claimant 
was not terminated by his mother’s death). 
 162. Id. 
 163. Simmons, supra note 31, at 141. 
 164. See id.; P.R.C. Succession Law Art. 14, 19. 
 165. Simmons, supra note 31, at 142.  American courts also have a strong distaste for 
escheat, choosing to “enforce it only as a last resort.” See Bd. of Educ. of Montgomery City. 
v. Browning 635 A.2d 373, 381 (Md. 1994) (Eldridge, J., dissenting). 
 166. Foster, supra note 39, at 207. 
 167. Id. (standing being limited to potential heirs and potential heirs being limited to 
“natural objects of a decedent’s bounty”). 
7_BROWN FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/6/2019  5:19 PM 
2019] YIN AND YANK INTESTACY 257 
F. Estate of Wang/Estate of Huaan 
In 1991, the decedent, Wang Weifa, died of cancer, leaving four 
first-order heirs:  his wife, his ten-year-old daughter, and his parents.168  
First-order heirs are covered under Article Thirteen of the P.R.C. 
Inheritance Law: 
Successors same in order shall, in general, inherit in equal shares.  At 
the time of distributing the estate, due consideration shall be given 
to successors who are unable to work and have special financial 
difficulties . . . [S]uccessors who have made the predominant 
contributions in maintaining the decedent or have lived with the 
decedent may be given a larger share . . . [S]uccessors who had the 
ability and were in a position to maintain the decedent but failed to 
fulfill their duties shall be given no share or a smaller share of the 
estate.169 
Here, the decedent’s parents were elderly, infirm, and without 
income.170  Likewise, the daughter was without income and unable to 
work, as she was school-aged.171  Pursuant to its equitable powers under 
Article 13, the court gave “due consideration” to the especially desperate 
circumstances and awarded the daughter and both parents larger than 
intestate shares, at the expense of the healthy spouse’s portion.172  The 
judge explained that Article 13 “reflects our country’s inheritance 
system’s basic principle of supporting the elderly and raising the 
young.”173 
This result is common in the Chinese system, as courts regularly 
cite Article 13 to reapportion shares to the neediest heirs.174  In marked 
contrast, the U.S. system only makes definitive provision for the 
surviving spouse, in the case of Wang, the individual who was most able 
to take care of herself.175  American jurisdictions do not recognize 
parental rights to an intestate share unless there is no surviving spouse 
 
 168. Linking Support and Inheritance, supra note 103, at 1231; ZHONGHUA RENMIN 
GONGHEGUO JICHENG FA QUANSHI [ANNOTATED P.R.C. INHERITANCE LAW] 94-95 (Zhou 
Xianqi ed., 1995) [hereinafter ANNOTATED INHERITANCE LAW]. 
 169. P.R.C. Succession Law Art. 13. 
 170. Linking Support and Inheritance, supra note 103, at 1231; ANNOTATED 
INHERITANCE LAW, supra note 168. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Linking Support and Inheritance, supra note 103, at 1232. 
 173. Id. 
 174. Id. at 1231. 
 175. Id. 
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and no issue.176  Remarkably, the ten-year-old daughter would not even 
receive a share under the UPC’s “conduit theory.”177 
In a similar Article 13 ruling, a Guangdong court considered the 
estate of Cen Huaan, the owner of a furniture store, who died intestate 
with four first-order heirs.178  Huaan was survived by his wife, his five-
year-old boy, and his parents.  Instead of distributing the estate equally 
four ways, the court made a careful determination about the relative need 
of the heirs:  “[Decedent’s parents] currently have several fishponds 
under contract and they are relatively well-to-do; [decedent’s spouse] is 
in the prime of her life and is able to work . . . [Decedent’s son] is only 
five years old and is not yet able to work.”179  Citing Article 13, the court 
reapportioned the estate, supporting the minor child with almost seventy-
five percent of the estate.180 
While Articles 10 and 12 of the P.R.C. Inheritance Law elevate 
extended family members (such as stepchildren, stepparents, and 
widowed sons- and daughters-in-law) to direct heirs, Chinese courts 
have also granted judicial remedies for non-heir dependents outside of 
the immediate or extended family.181  As defined above,182 such 
protections are extended through Article 14’s “appropriate share” 
provisions.183 
G. Estate of Ping 
The decedent, Yu Ping, died intestate survived by two heirs:  his 
elderly spouse and his able-bodied son.184  Yu became aware of the 
circumstances of an impoverished old man in the countryside and for 
more than a decade had voluntarily donated ten Yuan per month to the 
 
 176. E.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-102 (2010). 
 177. Id. The “conduit theory” justifies allocation of the entire estate to a surviving spouse 
in the event that any existing issue of the decedent are also issue of the spouse.  In these 
circumstances, it is thought that the spouse can be relied upon as a “conduit” to pass inherited 
wealth to the children upon his or her own death. E. Gary Spitko, The Expressive Function of 
Succession Law and the Merits of Non-Marital Inclusion, 41 ARIZ. L. REV. 1063, 1078 (1999). 
 178. Linking Support and Inheritance, supra note 103, at 1233. See Case No. 430, MIN 
SHANG FA XIN LEIXING ANLI JINGXI [Essential Analysis of New Types of Civil and 
Commercial Law Cases] 1216, 1216 (Liu Zhixin et al. eds., 1996). 
 179. Id.   
 180. Id. 
 181. Linking Support and Inheritance, supra note 103, at 1237. 
 182. See supra Section III.D.2. 
 183. P.R.C. Succession Law Art. 14. 
 184. Linking Support and Inheritance, supra note 103, at 1238. See Yu Hu v. Wang 
Chunlan, JICHENG FA ANLI XIANGJIE [Detailed Explanation of Inheritance Cases] 220 (Cui 
Qinglan & Tang Jing eds., 1990) [hereinafter Detailed Explanation of Inheritance Cases]. 
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old man’s cause.185  The court was able to exercise its substantial 
discretion and award shares to all.  Applying Article 10, the judge was 
able to reallocate the two heirs’ half portions to reflect the needs of the 
parties.186  As a result, the elderly widow’s share was substantially 
increased at the expense of the able-bodied son.187  The court then 
applied Article 14, granting intestate rights to the old man based on his 
inability to work, lack of income, and reliance on the decedent’s 
support.188  Despite his non-heir status, the old man was rescued from 
certain financial disaster by the court, which granted him a five hundred 
Yuan cash legacy.189   
Here, the court found an Article 14-mandated “support 
relationship” in financial assistance and was therefore able to assign a 
cash award to the old man.190  In practice, Chinese courts have wide 
latitude to infer support relationships in a variety of contexts, including 
the rearing of a child, physical and emotional care, and cohabitation.191  
Foster states, 
[u]nlike their U.S. counterparts, Chinese courts are not ‘handcuffed’ 
by rigid intestacy rules.  They have the flexibility to determine on a 
case-by-case basis the distribution that best reflects the individual 
needs of the claimant, circumstances of intestate heirs, overall nature 
and size of the estate, and actual services rendered by the 
decedent.192 
Indeed, an American Court would be forced to ignore relative 
circumstances and apply rigid, status-based rules resulting in a formulaic 
distribution.193  This result would leave the old man out in the cold, 
ultimately to be supported by state welfare.194 
H. The Shortcomings of Stare Decisis 
Indisputably, “Chinese courts are more concerned with substantive 
justice than with consistent results.”195  That consistency, however, is the 
 
 185. Linking Support and Inheritance, supra note 103, at 1238. See Detailed Explanation 
of Inheritance Cases, supra note 184. 
 186. Linking Support and Inheritance, supra note 103, at 1239. 
 187. Id. 
 188. See id. 
 189. Id.; see Detailed Explanation of Inheritance Cases, supra note 184.   
 190. Linking Support and Inheritance, supra note 103, at 1239. 
 191. Id. at 1238. 
 192. Id. 
 193. Id. 
 194. Id. 
 195. Simmons, supra note 31, at 147 (citing John J. Capowski, China’s Evidentiary and 
Procedural Reforms, the Federal Rules of Evidence, and the Harmonization of Civil and 
Common Law, 47 TEX. INT’L L.J. 455, 473 (2012)). 
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very hallmark of the American legal system.196  The principle that binds 
judges to precedent is known as stare decisis.197  Common law systems, 
like the United States emphasize the concept of stare decisis to ensure 
consistent application of rules, whereby similar facts yield similar 
outcomes.198 
For proponents of the American system, Chinese judicial discretion 
represents a “terrible price” to pay for improved support provisions.199  
Such redistribution schemes are complex, unpredictable, and perhaps 
even fundamentally unsuited to the United States environment.200 They 
would encourage litigation, increase costs, and pose a threat to family 
amity by incentivizing the airing of a family’s “dirty laundry” in court.201  
Essential to critics’ analysis of the Chinese system, judicial discretion is 
a direct assault on the “cherished notions of testamentary freedom” and 
stare decisis.202  The traditional and peculiar distrust that  many 
Americans have for government has led to a wholesale suspicion of both 
courts and the practice of “legislating from the bench.”203  But courts can 
do just as much harm through inaction.204  That stare decisis does, in 
fact, impede equity and justice can be seen in the application of a 
statutory intestacy-adjustment formula in the following case.205 
I. Estate of Moyer 
Moyer concerns the regrettable death of a toddler in a car 
accident.206  An emotional legal battle ensued between the child’s mother 
and his grandmother.207  For all intents and purposes, the mother had 
abandoned the child.208  Consequently. the grandmother claimed that 
such dereliction of family duty should result in the mother’s 
disinheritance.209  As is typical of American courts, the trial judge 
expressed ostensible regret at the ruling but insisted that precedent bound 
its ruling.210  The decision read:  “if this court were free to base its 
 
 196. Id. 
 197. Stare Decisis, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 198. See id. 
 199. Linking Support and Inheritance, supra note 103, at 1214. 
 200. Id. at 1215. 
 201. Id. 
 202. Id. 
 203. See Bruce G. Peabody, Legislating from the Bench: A Definition and a Defense, 11 
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 185, 185 (2007). 
 204. See Simmons, supra note 31, at 147. 
 205. Id. 
 206. In re Estate of Moyer, 758 A.2d 206, 207 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000). 
 207. Id. at 206-07. 
 208. See id. at 209-10. 
 209. Id. at 207. 
 210. Id. at 210. 
7_BROWN FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/6/2019  5:19 PM 
2019] YIN AND YANK INTESTACY 261 
decision on fairness and common sense rather than appellant precedent, 
we would sign a forfeiture order as soon as it could be prepared.”211  
Ultimately, the court interpreted the statutory phrase “failed to provide 
any duty of support” in a stringently literal manner, and found for the 
mother, acknowledging “any crumb a parent [threw] in front of [the] 
child.”212 
The outcome in Moyer serves to remind us of the dire consequences 
that unchecked stare decisis can have on our intestacy system.  A fixed 
system of formulas can never provide the requisite human element 
necessary to ensure simple common sense results in inheritance 
battles.213  Note that in this case, the rigid application of the statutory 
formula actually flew in the face of presumed testamentary intent.214  
Though a toddler’s mind remains a mysterious thing, the court found it 
exceedingly likely that the boy would have wanted his loving 
grandmother to inherit the estate rather than the mother he never knew.215  
Thus, the inelastic nature of stare decisis creates perverse outcomes 
where the unworthy can, and do, inherit through statutory loopholes. 
IV. ANALYSIS 
The status quo of American intestacy law is insufficient to provide 
broad support to the population and therefore fails its modern directive 
of replacing the social welfare system.216  Reforms to the system have 
been trivial at best and have not reached the root of the problem—the 
inherent bias in favor of the traditional American family, which places 
undue value on family status while disregarding support for the 
marginalized.217  Fundamentally, the law has failed to “adapt to the 
changing American family” and the very real relationships underpinning 
it.218 
Intestacy rules are formulaic and one-size-fits-all, where presumed 
majoritarian intent preys upon actual testamentary intent.219  Lawmakers 
have determined that most Americans would prefer their estate to pass 
only to immediate family members in an ordered rubric, but such a 
notion may be a relic from the past.220  By limiting intestate heirs to 
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“natural objects of the decedent’s bounty,” courts and legislatures alike 
have funneled the benefits of the intestacy scheme to an ever-dwindling 
portion of the population.221  As such, the Family Paradigm itself 
represents a form of judicial discretion in favor of the traditional 
American family unit. 
The UPC admittedly made strides in recognizing “kindred of half-
blood”222 and adopted children223 but regrettably, only a handful of states 
have passed laws of their own to that effect.224  Accordingly, our 
definition of children for intestacy purposes remains outdated.225  Even 
those states that have adopted UPC provisions still do not recognize non-
marital children, children of unmarried cohabitants, or any non-related 
individuals in a child-parent relationship with the decedent.226  The 
definition of spouse also remains woefully outmoded.227  Commentators 
have called for the inclusion of committed partners and even non-blood 
relatives,228  and many wish to expand the boundaries of the traditional 
family paradigm altogether to provide for the decedent’s close family 
and friends, like in China.229 
Such rigid classifications provide opportunities for unworthy heirs 
to slip through the cracks and inherit windfalls.  Allowing a wrongdoer 
to profit from wrongdoing effectively dismisses the most important 
societal purpose of intestacy, that of support.230  Linking support with 
inheritance can only benefit the decedent and the survivor by 
incentivizing a two-way support system.  Progress in America has been 
slow on this front, apart from Slayer Statutes.231  But even Slayer rules 
are too inflexible to be practical, as many states restrict their application 
to cases in which the killing is felonious and intentional.232  Thus, many 
statutes do not apply to those who commit abuse, neglect, or 
 
 221. See Foster, supra note 39, at 271. 
 222. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-107 (2010). 
 223. Id. § 2-114 (2010). 
 224. Uniform Law Commission:  The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform 
State Laws, UNIFORMLAWS.COM, 
http://www.uniformlaws.org/Act.aspx?title=Probate%20Code (last visited Jan. 31, 2018). 
 225. Foster, supra note 39, at 228. 
 226. See id. at 228-29. 
 227. See id. at 229. 
 228. See Susan N. Gary, The Probate Definition of Family:  A Proposal for Guided 
Discretion in Intestacy, 45 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 787, 787 (2012). 
 229. See id.   
 230. See Brown, supra note 79. 
 231. Id. at 558. 
 232. Laurel Sevier, Kooky Collects:  How the Conflict Between Law and Psychiatry 
Grants Inheritance Rights to California’s Mentally Ill Slayers, 47 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 379, 
387 (2007). 
7_BROWN FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/6/2019  5:19 PM 
2019] YIN AND YANK INTESTACY 263 
exploitation, so long as the killing was not intentional.233  With reports 
of escalating elder abuse and neglect within the American family,234 such 
statutes are wholly under-inclusive.235 
Some progress has been made in other areas of the unworthy heir 
doctrine, but successes are few and far between.  North Carolina has 
attempted to link inheritance with support and merit in the area of child 
abandonment.236  Section 31A-2 of the General Statutes of North 
Carolina bars a parent from inheriting through intestacy or sharing in a 
wrongful death claim if he abandons the child.237  California law deals 
with the issue of “deadbeat dads” through its UPC provision: 
If a child is born out of wedlock, . . . a natural parent . . . [does not 
inherit] from or through the child on the basis of the parent and child 
relationship between that parent and the child unless both of the 
following requirements are satisfied:  
(a) The parent or relative of the parent acknowledged the child.  
(b) The parent or relative of the parent contributed to the support or the care of 
the child.238 
These examples remain the exception, not the norm.  Finally, the 
issue of “laughing heirs” remains a substantial problem.239  Claimants 
who may not have even met the decedent receiving awards at the 
expense of loyal caregivers does not satisfy our aim of justice.  Scholars 
agree that intestate laws should limit succession at the second collateral 
line.240  Unfortunately, many states still have not adopted the UPC 
recommendation in their codes.241 
Professor Friedman sums up the state of U.S. intestacy 
appropriately: 
It does not matter . . . whether one [heir] is rich and another poor; 
one a minor, one not; one blind and destitute, another not—they 
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share equally in the estate.  No discretion to alter the scheme is vested 
in the probate court or in any other legal agency.242 
Support of dependents is not only dismissed; it is discouraged.243  
Where courts have no power to decide personal matters of intestacy 
according to individual need and merit, unjust results will continue to 
transpire. 
V. PROPOSAL 
The intestacy status quo is not only unreasonable, it is economically 
unsustainable in the long-term.244  As a country of immigrants, we can 
no longer afford our narrow and overly formalistic definition of family 
that excludes such a large portion of our populace from intestate 
succession.245 
I propose adopting support-based reforms to help situate America 
more in line with the civil law tradition.  The UPC represents a marked 
improvement from common law, in that it dramatically expands the 
definition of family and prevents laughing heirs.  However, it has only 
been adopted in seventeen states.246  If we truly want consistency, the 
Uniform Probate Code must be uniform.  That would mean larger states, 
such as California, New York, and Texas, substantially adopting the 
provisions to lend legitimacy to the scheme. 
Furthermore, the UPC support provisions must be expanded, using 
what some have referred to as a “functional approach,” whereby the rigid 
Family Paradigm is appended with a scheme that focuses on the quality 
of the relationship, instead of categorical status.247  We can use the 
functional approach to expand the scope of the unworthy heir doctrine 
beyond merely slayers.  The California “deadbeat dad” statute 
referenced above serves to illustrate this approach.248  By coupling the 
“act of becoming a parent” (birth or adoption) with “the act of being a 
parent” (care and nurturing), we can tie inheritance to merit and curb 
child abandonment.249 
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Similarly, the United States system could extend this thinking to the 
issue of elderly dependents.  No longer would neglectful and abusive 
children get to inherit for their misdeeds.250 These reforms would 
incentivize the support of the decedent by forcing caregivers into 
submission for fear of disinheritance.  Such reforms would also 
encourage support of the dependent survivors, by allowing for a 
functional, relationship-based approach in determining qualifying heirs.  
Perhaps most importantly, this approach allows America to retain its 
common law tradition.  Rather than overhauling the American system to 
fit a foreign model, it should acknowledge the centrality of the 
traditional—American family—while also recognizing that additional 
deserving recipients of the decedent’s estate might exist.251 
Additionally, instead of a mandatory share for heirs in the mold of 
Article 19 of the P.R.C. Inheritance Law, America should attempt to 
replicate Article 14, its corollary, by extending inheritance to non-family 
heirs.  Unlike Article 19, Article 14 merely provides a forum for heirs 
and non-heirs alike to make a claim for an intestate share.252  No shares 
are forced upon the decedent; therefore her testamentary freedom is 
preserved while ensuring a hearing in equity to resolve disputes.253  
Courts could expand their narrow definition of a “natural” recipient and 
develop a “support relationship with decedent” standard, much like 
Article 14.254  This new judicial principle would bolster support to both 
the decedent during her lifetime and to her needy survivors.255 
Finally, caregivers could be regarded as “natural objects of a 
decedent’s bounty.”256  The idea being an expansion of the pool of 
potential heirs, so Americans may more fully realize testamentary 
freedom.  A testator’s attempt to reward good behavior would no longer 
be perceived as a coerced act.257  Removing the presumption in favor of 
undue influence might strip the Family Paradigm of its bias and 
ultimately restore genuine donative freedom.258  Finally, the United 
States should introduce automatic forfeiture provisions to induce care of 
the decedent by the heir.259  Examples include if the heir was a slayer, if 
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the heir committed fraud in wills proceedings, if the heir forged or 
destroyed decedent’s will, and if the heir seriously abused or humiliated 
the decedent and has been forbidden from inheriting.260 
Ultimately, a pure mandatory share is unworkable, such that many 
scholars now question the efficacy of China’s Article 19 scheme.261  
China claims that its mandatory share triggers support functions but such 
a claim is questionable at best.262  First, meeting both burdens of “unable 
to work” and “no income” is rarely done.263  Second, if an heir does not 
meet both burdens, the testator is free to disinherit.264  Third, Article 19’s 
“necessary portion” only takes into account ability to work and income, 
disregarding the actual poverty of a potential heir.265  Accordingly, the 
current provisions may be contrary to family support by providing 
insufficient protections to needy heirs, leaving society to carry the 
burden.266  Indeed, many decedents often leave their estates to non-
family heirs.267 
Finally, despite the “frightening” prospect of a judicial discretion 
scheme in the United States,268 such a system represents an eminently 
plausible way of ensuring social support functions through private 
actors.  An American family maintenance model would allow for 
equitable distribution of an estate on a case-by-case basis.269  Critics 
point to an assault on testamentary freedom,270 but the majoritarian intent 
of the testator is ultimately better realized when a court can remedy 
common sense injustices and provide for the public welfare. 
It should be noted that this scheme does not apply automatically 
and is only administered upon petition by qualifying claimants.271  
Furthermore, a testator is always free to opt out of the default scheme 
and make her bequest by will.272  Indeed, in a case upholding the validity 
of a duly executed will, the Chinese legal analysis states, “[i]t should be 
made clear that even if an heir performed duties toward the decedent, the 
decedent can, nonetheless, make a will leaving his or her estate to 
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another person. To be effective, the will need only conform with the 
requirements stipulated in the Inheritance Law.”273  Thus, the available 
opt-out sufficiently protects a decedent’s interests, especially in relation 
to the increased ability of courts on the other hand to provide for the 
public welfare. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Chinese inheritance law is a complicated convergence of its 
Confucian past, socialist present, and increasingly capitalist future.  
Despite the passage of time, the notion of family and support have 
remained paramount in Chinese society.  Such notions exist in America, 
only they are manifested in a slightly different manner.  Whereas China 
emphasizes need and community support, America stresses status and 
individual testamentary freedom. Indeed, these concepts do not exist in 
isolation but are rather two sides of the same coin, helping to expose our 
respective societies’ values and biases. 
Over the next few decades each country will face a stiff test of 
providing support for their aging populations.  China’s system is 
considerably more flexible, responsive, and better equipped to deal with 
the changing nature of its population in the twenty-first century.  China’s 
support provisions appear surprisingly practical, indicating that the costs 
of unpredictability and postmortem chaos are offset by the benefits of 
the scheme’s dual support outcomes.274  Ultimately, it is the human 
component that differentiates the yin from the yank, helping us to 
“recognize that the ties of human affection do not run solely along family 
lines.”275   
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